Entry deterrence in postal service markets by Beschorner, Patrick
Dis cus si on Paper No. 07-083
Entry Deterrence in 
Postal Service Markets
Patrick F.E. Beschorner
Dis cus si on Paper No. 07-083
Entry Deterrence in 
Postal Service Markets
Patrick F.E. Beschorner
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp07083.pdf
Non-technical Summary
The German postal service market will be completely liberalized in 2008.
Currently, the market is already liberalized for parcels and letters exceeding
50 grams. The incumbent Deutsche Post AG (DPAG) has the exclusive right
to transport letters up to 50 grams. But competitors can already obtain a
license for this reserved segment if they offer a higher service quality. In
contrast to DPAG, which provides the universal service, entrants can select
the geographical area in which they are active.
The exclusive license of DPAG runs out at the beginning of 2008. Then
any firm will be allowed to enter the market for postal service below 50
grams and there will be no minimum quality requirement. The universal
service obligation will be upheld and we expect the incumbent DPAG will
be responsible for doing so. In the light of the upcoming liberalization we
observe that the German postal service started to improve its service quality
six months prior to the liberalization. DPAG is testing the delivery of certain
items on Sundays. The paper aims to analyze this type of situation based on
the theory of vertically differentiated markets.
The model developed shows that a rational strategy for an incumbent is
to increase quality to deter entry or to soften quality and price when market
entry is anticipated. This behavior may aim at setting up entry barriers to
deter or to limit competition in 2008. We find that DPAG’s rise in quality
is likely to be motivated by the desire to set up entry barriers. However,
consumers benefit from higher service quality and lower prices, even if entry
does not occur.
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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the incentive of the German postal service
(Deutsche Post AG, DPAG) to increase quality in the light of the
upcoming liberalization of the postal services market. Currently, there
would be no incentive for DPAG to increase its quality if the market
were not to be liberalized in six months. Therefore, we suggest that
the current changes in market regulation have motivated this quality
improvement. In particular we show that this rise in quality is only
profitable to DPAG because it renders entry less profitable or even
impossible. However, consumers benefit from higher quality, whether
entry is deterred or accommodated.
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31 Introduction
In a press release from 9 May 2007, Deutsche Post AG (DPAG) announced
its intention to test the delivery of certain items on Sundays.1 In the light of
coming liberalization of the postal service market in Germany this decision
is of particular interest because it may reflect the strategic decision to raise
the quality level which will be perceived as a standard on 1 January 2008.
This is the date when delivery of standard letters will be liberalized.
This observation raises the question of whether the service quality is
strategically raised owing to the current regulatory setting. Owing to the
incentives created by the liberalization the new quality standard may be
inefficiently high.
The universal service obligation (USO) which is codified in § 11 PostG2
and the §§ 1,2 PUDLV3 requires a minimum standard quality from the
provider of the USO. This consists of a daily delivery of mail on weekdays,
i.e. six days per week. Even this level of service has been called into question
in the ongoing discussion because still there are other means of delivering
urgent physical documents if necessary and information can be distributed
easily by E-mail or telefax.
Under the current regulation scheme, DPAG has an exclusive license on
standard letters, but competitors can obtain a license to offer specific ser-
vices. A full service license which is of particular interest in this paper is
codified in § 51 (1), No.4 PostG.4. This type of license allows to offer the
entire value chain: collecting, sorting, and delivering mail. Services which
do not jeopardize the USO of the incumbent and which have specifics which
constitute a higher service quality for the consumers can be licensed. Some
1See
http://www.dpwn.de/dpwn?tab=2&skin=hi&check=no&lang=de DE&xmlFile=2007865.
2Postgesetz.
3Post-Universaldienstverordnung.
4Postgesetz.
4operators have already entered regional markets but, to our knowledge, no
service provider yet covers the full area that is covered by the USO. The
exclusive license of DPAG runs out by the beginning of 2008. Any operator
will be permitted to offer postal services of all categories. There will be no
restriction concerning the higher service quality.
The next section gives an overview on related literature. The third section
develops the basic model and two applications which are discussed in the
fourth section. The final section concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is an established strand of literature on vertical differentiation. The
seminal contributions by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) give a rationale for
competition in vertical differentiation. They establish that even in the ab-
sence of fixed cost, the distribution of firms may not be atomistic when firms
differentiate vertically. The number of active firms may be limited because a
single firm can cover a whole range of quality levels and thus blockade further
entry. In a natural duopoly where the firms first simultaneously set quali-
ties and then prices, the firms differentiate their qualities at equilibrium.
However, the degree of differentiation is not maximal, as it is in horizon-
tal differentiation in Neven’s (1985) quadratic cost version of the Hotelling
(1929) model. The firm with the higher quality earns higher profits. In order
to explain how the firms choose their position on the quality ladder, Hung
and Schmitt (1988) propose sequential entry where the incumbent firm can
credibly set his quality. A potential entrant faces a fixed entry cost. If the
firms decide to enter the two firms then compete in prices. The authors show
that the incumbent offers higher quality if entry occurs. If a fixed entry cost
exceeds a certain threshold entry will be deterred.
Sequential entry with three firms is analyzed by Donnenfeld and Weber
5(1992). This paper considers two cases: Either three firms enter the mar-
ket sequentially, choosing their qualities, or two firms enter simultaneously
and a third firm enters afterwards. Price competition follows after all entry
decisions have been taken. In both cases the two first firms chose maxi-
mal differentiation and the third firm offers intermediate quality. Offering
a higher quality implies higher profit. This means that the last entrant is
better-off than the low-quality incumbent. We include a similar structure in
the present model: the entrant offers a higher quality than the incumbent. In
contrast to their 1992 paper, Donnenfeld and Weber (1995) introduce entry
cost, with the result that entry can be deterred. They show how the magni-
tude of entry costs determine the choice of qualities that the two first firms
offer. In particular, if the two incumbent firms cooperate they accommodate
entry, while under competition they tend to deter entry.
All named papers so far and also other analyses of vertical differentiation
like Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986), Choi and Shiin (1992), or Tirole (1988)
assume no production cost or no quality-dependent costs. Lutz (1997) in-
troduces entry costs and quality-dependent costs in a setting with two firms.
This endogenizes the upper bound on quality choice. He finds that the re-
lation between the two firms’ quality-dependent costs determine the incum-
bent’s incentive to deter entry. If these costs are equal the incumbent deters
entry by setting a lower quality than he would do under monopoly with no
threat of entry. Raising the fixed entry cost reduces this deviation from
the monopoly quality until a threshold value where entry is blockaded. If
the entrant has higher quality-dependent costs, accommodating entry will be
more profitable then deterring entry, because the entrant offers a low quality.
This guarantees to the incumbent to serve the high quality segment instead
of lowering its quality in order to blockade entry. In turn, if the entrant
has lower quality costs accommodating entry and the incumbent offering the
lower quality may be the equilibrium outcome. Lutz stresses that cost dif-
ferentials may result from policy measures like subsidies. This is a relevant
6point in the context of regulated industries where access to essential facilities
is administered by competition authorities.
Valletti et al. (2002) model an incumbent with a uniform pricing con-
straint (UP) and (in part) a converage constraint (CC). An entrant offers
a horizontally differentiated product and sets its coverage and price. Little
(large) coverage induces a soft (tough) price competition. In the present pa-
per, we analyze vertical differentiation in the setting of Shaked and Sutton
(1983), combined with UP and CC as in Valletti et al.
Donnenfeld and Weber (1992, 1995) and Lutz (1997) show that an entrant
can end up with a higher quality than an incumbent. In a stochastic setting
Filippini (1999) assumes that both entrant and incumbent can invest in R&D,
the outcome of which is either an enhanced product or a cost reduction.
The probability of the two events is identical for both firms. If the entrant
succeeds in enhancing quality he can imitate the incumbent’s product at
lower cost. A cost reduction reduces the marginal cost of production in the
subsequent quantity competition. As the incumbent’s quality raises the cost
of imitation, the incumbent may have an incentive to raise his initial quality
above the level when there is no threat of entry. The incumbent’s aim in
doing so would be to make the entrant’s investment in cost reduction more
attractive than in quality enhancement.
3 The Model
The utility function u(s, p) = θ · s− p describes a consumer of type θ. This
demand structure is adopted from Mussa and Rosen (1978) where each con-
sumer purchases one unit of the product or service at most. We consider
a continuum of consumers who differ in their preference for postal services
according to the parameter θ ∈ [θ; θ]. θ > 0 should be interpreted as the
minimum quality/price which is defined by the USO. Consumers are uni-
7formly distributed over this interval. The presence of courier services, which
could provide similar service, albeit at a much higher price, could serve as an
explanation for a strict upper bound for the consumers’ valuation θ.5
Let s ≥ 0 denote the quality of the product or service, where uj(s′) >
uk(s
′′) for all consumers j, k and s′ > s′′ which means that the service is
vertically differentiated. The price of the service offered by firm i is denoted
by pi. Each firm offers at most one product. The cost of providing the quality
s by firm i is ci(s). Assume that c(s) is convex: c
′
i(s) > 0, c
′′
i (s) > 0, and
ci(0) = c
′
i = 0.
The consumers’ reservation utility is zero. They realize a unit demand
if u = θs − p ≥ 0, i.e. all consumers θ ≥ p1/s1 purchase from firm 1, the
incumbent firm. The USO stipulates that a certain quality is to provided
at an affordable price. This determines a minimum quality and a maximum
price that the incumbent firm sets. These imply a lower bound θ ≡ p1/s1.
- θ
0 θ ≡ p1/s1 θ
The incumbent firm provides service to all customers θ ∈ [θ, θ]. The profit
is
pi1 = d
(
θ − p1
s1
)
p1 − c1(s1) (1)
where for expositional reasons d denotes the density of consumers on the
interval [θ, θ].
5Defining the relevant market by a SSNIP of 5-10% for standard mail service without
any competitors would probably not render courier services more attractive to a significant
extent. Therefore a strict upper bound θ seems to be appropriate.
83.1 Status Quo
This subsection provides a benchmark to assess the current market behavior
in order to compare it with the behavior of a regulated monopolist who is
not facing potential entry. In absence of the regulations set out in the USO,
the profit maximizing strategy is given by the first order conditions
d
(
θ − 2p1
s1
)
= 0 (2)
d
p21
s21
= c′1(s1) (3)
which can be combined to
d
θ
2
4
= c′1(s1).
This immediately implies that rising demand drives the incentive to pro-
vide higher quality, either through a rise in demand expressed by the density
of consumers d or through a shift of the upper end of the consumer valuation
θ. (2) holds if i is not constrained in setting p1. Current observation of DPAG
indicates that the foc is positive. DPAG is willing to raise its price, but the
regulatory authority was committed to cut the price for standard mail in a
debate on undue cross-subsidization in 2002. Furthermore, the last proposal
by DPAG for a reduction of postage for standard mail was the minimum
reduction of one cent by 2003.
The incentive of the incumbent monopolist to raise the quality when the
density is constant (and normalized to one) is given by the first derivative of
(1)
d
p21
s21
− c′1(s1) = 0. (4)
While the upper bound of consumers θ is invariable, more consumers on the
lower bound θ > p1/s1 are willing to buy. Since we observe that DPAG
9just meets the USO, we can conclude that it has no incentive to increase its
quality.
In brief, the USO imposes a higher quality and a lower price on the
incumbent than an unconstrained monopolist would choose.
3.2 One Entrant
In this section we analyze the incentive of an entrant who considers p1, s1
as given. In particular, we will focus on the entrant’s optimal entry decision
and her conditional choice of pe, se. Then we can draw conclusions on the
incumbent’s incentive to deter entry.
Any entrant is required to offer a superior quality: se > s1. This holds at
least in the perception of the parties involved in each single correspondence:
the sender and the recipient.6 However, there is no requirement that the
licensed activity should be perceived as superior within the entire geographi-
cal scope of this regulation. The entrant may serve a restricted geographical
area. Typically, entrants serve densely populated area or areas where they al-
rady have specific infrastructure.7 Consequently, the entrant’s standard mail
service8 is still at a disadvantage because of its restricted service area. There-
fore, assume that this handicap is denoted by δ. The implicit willingness to
pay for the entrant’s service if it covered the same service is pe = p2 +δ. Also
we assume that δ < p1, i.e. that the discount the entrant must offer is less
than the regulated price of the incumbent. Furthermore, the average price of
the new competitors for a standard letter is 44 cents.9 This is below DPAG’s
6Bundesnetzagentur 2006, p.44.
7Main-PostLogistik GmbH serves only the Lower Franconia region. Morgenpost-
Briefservice GmbH serves the Mannheim area and cooperates with partners in other re-
gions. Both firms are newspaper publishes and they make use of their established network
for newspaper delivery.
8A letter not exceeding 20 grams.
9See Bundesnetzagentur 2006, p.35.
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price of 55 cents. Still, we observe that DPAG’s market share is overwhelm-
ing. This indicates that some consumers still prefer the incumbent’s service:
θs1 − p1 > max[0; θse − pe]. This is equivalent to 0 < p1/s1 < pe/se and
implies that pe > p1 as se > s1.
- θ
0 θ ≡ p1/s1 pe/se pe − p1
se − s1 θ
It is obvious that a consumer who is willing to purchase from the entrant
would also purchase from the incumbent because θ > pe/se implies θ > θ.
Now, only consumers who fulfil the condition θ > pe/se > θ can effectively
choose between the incumbent and the entrant. The remaining consumers ei-
ther purchase from the incumbent or not at all, because they have a valuation
below θ.
Consumers choose between the incumbent and the entrant according to
θs1 − p1 > θse − pe which is equivalent to
θ <
pe − p1
se − s1 (5)
indicating the consumers who purchase from the incumbent. The incum-
bent’s profit is
pi1 =
(
pe − p1
se − s1 −
p1
s1
)
p1 − c1(s1). (6)
In a static analysis, where an entrant would not react by adapting her price,
an incumbent’s increase in quality would raise his profit by
∂pi1
∂s1
=
(pe − p1)p1
(se − s1)2 +
p21
s21
− c′1(s1). (7)
Comparing with (4) immediately shows that for a given s1 the incentive to
raise quality is higher for the incumbent when an entrant is present. The
11
reason is that, in addition to attracting new consumers at the lower bound,
customers on the upper bound (pe − p1)/se − s1) switch to the incumbent.
The latter effect adds to the effect described by (4). This implies that s1
would be set at a higher level under competition because of the convexity of
c1.
Hitherto, the incumbent has faced a static environment where the entrant
does not anticipate or react to a change of quality s1. Now, we shall examine
what happens when the entrant can adapt her quality se and adjust her
price pe. In order to determine the incumbent’s incentive to deter or to
accommodate entry we derive the entrant’s optimal entry strategy given s1
and p1. The effective price of the entrant is p2 = pe − δ and her profit is
pie =
(
θ − pe − p1
se − s1
)
(pe − δ)− ce(se). (8)
Combining the first order conditions
∂pie
∂pe
= − pe − δ
se − s1 + θ −
pe − p1
se − s1 = 0 (9)
∂pie
∂se
=
(pe − p1)(pe − δ)
(se − s1)2 − c
′
e(se) = 0 (10)
by inserting (9) into (10) yields
L ≡ θ
2
4
− 1
4
(p1 − δ)2
(s∗e − s1)2
= c′e(s
∗
e) ≡ R. (11)
We can show
Lemma 1 If s∗e satisfying (11) exists, then s
∗
e > se where se > s1.
The left hand side (L) of (11) has the following properties: limse→∞ L =
θ
2
/4, limse>s1, se→s1 L = −∞, and L is concave. The right hand side R
has the following properties: limse→∞R = ∞, c′e(0) = 0, and R is convex.
Consequently, L and R either intersect twice, have an osculation point se,
12
or have no point in common. In the first case s∗e = max[s
′
e, s
′′
e ] where s
′
e, s
′′
e
denote the two intersection points. In the third case no s∗e in the relevant
range se > s1 exists. se is the smallest value for se that can meet (9) and
(10). 2
-
6
θ
4
s1 ses
′
e s
′′
e
c
(3)
e c
(2)
e c
(1)
e
se
Lemma 1 is a first order condition. This does not guarantee that the
entrant’s profit is positive for all s∗e > se. For the entrant’s profit to be
positive a necessary condition is that her demand θ − (pe − p1)(se − s1) is
positive. This is equivalent to
s∗e >
pe − p1
θ
− s1
and inserting pe from (9) yields
s∗e > s1 −
p1 − δ
θ
.
From Lemma 1, s∗e > s1 is satisfied and p1 > δ holds by assumption. This
condition is not sufficient because the inframarginal costs ce are not consid-
ered in the marginal analysis. Actual entry in this market indicates that
(expected) profit is positive. This means that the cost of quality must be
13
sufficiently low to render entry a profitable strategy. Otherwise, we would
observe no entry.
Now we turn to the incumbent’s strategic behavior in the light of a pos-
sible deterrence strategy in the pre-liberalization period. First we will argue
that the monopolist is better-off if entry does not take place. Subsequently,
we will show that deterrence is possible and what strategy the incumbent
has to choose in order to keep an entrant out of the market.
Comparing (1) and (6), it quickly becomes clear that a monopolist who
sticks to p1, s1 is harmed by an entrant because (pe− p1)/(se− s1) < θ. This
means that a monopolist may have an incentive to impede entry. Under the
regulatory regime, the monopolist can raise his quality but the maximum
price is fixed by the regulatory authority. Consequently, the only choice
variable of the monopolist is his quality s1 which can be raised without the
consent of the regulatory authority.
We can show that raising s1 induces the entrant to reduce her price and
quality and this reduces the prospective profit of an entrant. If the entrant’s
prospective profit drops below zero entry is deterred.
In order to show this effect, we assume that (11) holds and that (8) is
positive. This means that a firm can profitably enter if the monopolist sticks
to p1, s1. In (11) we see that raising s1 to s
′
1 > s1 reduces L. In order
to compensate for this effect on L se would have to be raised. However,
increasing se would raise both L and R and the overall effect would be
ambiguous. As we know from profit maximization in Lemma 1 that L crosses
R from above, the slope of L must be smaller than that of R in se = s∗e.
Thus, lessening the quality se reduces R to a larger extent than L, such that
s∗∗e < s
∗
e satisfies (11) for s
′
1 > s1. The effect on the prices can be inferred
from (9) which transforms into
pe =
θ
2
(se − s1) + p1
2
+
δ
2
. (12)
We see that reducing se in combination with a rise in s1 implies a price
14
cut by the entrant. Overall this reduces the entrant’s profit. This follows
immediately from (11) because s1 reduces the marginal revenue for each level
of se. As the profit is the integral of marginal revenue minus marginal cost
over the interval [0; s∗∗e ] a rise in s1 reduces the entrants profit. Therefore we
can state
Proposition 1 If the incumbent can commit to a higher quality s′1 > s1 this
renders the entrant’s entry strategy less profitable. If s1 exceeds a threshold
value s1 then entry is deterred.
The reduction in profit has been inferred above. It remains to be shown that
the profit is monotone in s1. This is the case because the marginal revenue
L is monotone and so is the total revenue. Since limse>s1, se→s1 pie = −∞ and
pie(s
∗
e, s1) > 0 and the profit is monotone in s1 a threshold value s1 exists
such that pie > (<)0 for s1 < (>)s1. 2
If an incumbent can set a level of quality that an entrant has to react
upon he is in the situation of a Stackelberg leader. We have shown that
the incumbent would not be willing to raise his quality unless an entrant
is present. This means that s1 exceeds the profit maximizing quality as a
monopolist. However, deviating even further from the optimal quality level
reduces the incumbent’s profit pi1. Consequently, the incumbent has the
choice of accommodating entry or deterring entry. Both strategies are less
profitable than staying as a regulated monopolist, but the incumbent has to
opt for one of them.
3.3 Welfare Analysis
Shaked and Sutton (1983) state that a market with vertical differentiation
may result in a natural oligopoly. This analogous to the situation of a natural
monopolist, where the subadditivity of the cost function implies that welfare
15
is highest, if the good is provided by the sole (regulated) firm. In this section
we analyze the effects of the incumbent’s strategic behavior on welfare.
We start with the case of the regulated monopolist as a benchmark case.
The Universal Service Obligation assures that there is an affordable postal
service with a well-defined quality. This means that all consumers with a val-
uation parameter θ > p1/s1 = θ will demand one unit. Thus, the Consumer
surplus is
θ∫
θ=p1/s1
(θs1 − p1) dθ = 1
2
s1(θ
2 − θ2)− p1(θ − θ). (13)
When the incumbent raises his quality s′1 > s1 in order to deter entry
by a potential competitor, more consumers purchase the product because
the quality is improved, raising the consumers’ willingness to pay. Then
consumers with a valuation p1/s
′
1 < θ are indifferent between purchasing the
product or not doing so.
θ∫
p1/s′1<θ
(θs′1 − p1) dθ =
1
2
s′1
(
θ
2 − p1
s′1
)2
− p1(θ − p1
s′1
). (14)
Finally, if the incumbent does not increase his quality and accommodates
entry, then there are two qualities available on the market: the lower from
the incumbent s1 and the higher from the entrant se. Then the consumer
surplus is
pe−p1
se−s1∫
θ
(θs1 − p1) dθ +
θ∫
pe−p1
se−s1
(θse − pe) dθ =
1
2
(
θ
2 −
(
pe − p1
se − s1
)2)
se +
1
2
((
pe − p1
se − s1
)2
− θ2
)
s1
16
−
(
θ − pe − p1
se − s1
)
pe −
(
pe − p1
se − s1 − θ
)
p1 (15)
A comparison of the three consumer surpluses allows us to infer that
Proposition 2 Consumers are unambiguously better-off when entry is pos-
sible.
Comparing the consumer surpluses immediately indicates that consumers
benefit from both potential entry and actual entry. In the first case, the
incumbent raises his quality. This benefits all present consumers and those
who become customers because their willingness to pay exceeds the price.
In the second case, consumers can now choose which product they want to
purchase. Therefore they are clearly better off.
A comparison of the welfare effects would require us to specify the quality
cost function. Conversely, the entrant’s price affects the choice of customers
among the two suppliers. pThe distribution of income is irrelevant for effi-
ciency considerations.
4 Discussion
We have seen from (12) that the incumbent increases his quality if he antic-
ipates that a rival may enter the market. This effect occurs whether entry
is deterred or accommodated. In the latter case the entrant offers a lower
quality at a lower price compared to the situation where the incumbent does
not anticipate entry and sticks to the regulated price and quality. The in-
tuition for entrant’s reaction is that the firms have two dimensions in which
they compete. Now as the incumbent is only free to raise his quality but
not his price, the entrant has one more instrument available, in the form of
her price. If the incumbent raises his quality this means that he competes
in the quality dimension. This limits the entrant’s profit opportunities and
17
therefore the entrant is no longer willing to bear the cost of such a high
quality level. However, in order to avoid competition she will compete in
the remaining dimension, namely the price. To sum up, the entrant’s quality
decreases because the market volume shrinks and her price drops because it
is her principal strategic variable.
We have shown that if entry is deterred (14) or entry occurs without
a reaction by the incumbent (15) the consumers benefit compared to the
situation where no entry is possible. However, there are two countervailing
effects which make it impossible to formulate a clear preference between the
two scenarios. In (14) more customers are served and they receive a higher
quality s′1 while in (15) only a share of the initial group of customers receives
an even higher quality than s′1.
Comparing (4) and (7) has shown that the incumbent has a higher in-
centive to raise his quality when an entrant is present than when there is
no entry. The reason is that he can attract additional customers not only
among those who have not purchased yet but also from customers who might
opt for the entrant’s product. This means that if entry is possible and the
incumbent can raise his quality while still accommodating entry, then the
total number of customers will increase. However, as the entrant lowers his
quality and his price, those customers who would opt for the high quality
service are harmed. Therefore the overall effect compared to the situation
with the incumbent sticking to p1, s1 is not clear a priori.
We have argued that a comparison between deterrence and accommoda-
tion is ambiguous. However, the explanatory power of such a comparison
would be limited because quality costs are not yet considered. Our modeling
does not specify the quality cost function. Therefore we cannot formulate
statements about inframarginal costs and, thus, total costs. Since the con-
sumers’ payments are pure redistribution of income, only the quality costs
matter for a welfare comparison. Furthermore, we have disregarded the qual-
ity cost which may differ significantly between the entrant and the incumbent.
18
In the case of DPAG we know for at least two reasons that competitors
have significantly lower cost. First, the latter do not have the burden of
taking over the workforce of the former state post administration. Secondly,
DPAG does not charge sales tax, while entrants do for private customers.
This is at least relevant for business with private customers–even though this
makes up only a small share of total business.
Throughout the paper we have presumed that quality can be set by the
firms in a credible way. This would allow DPAG to deter entry. The credi-
bility is essential for rendering deterrence possible at all. However, it seems
that providing a quality level once is a commitment for later periods. The
directives 97/67/EC and 2002/39/EC specify minimum standards for the
universal postal service in Europe. DPAG is free to offer a higher quality
and they do so because of the German Regulation on the Universal Service10
in delivering mail on Saturdays. However, now in the light of entry, they
are testing an increase in quality. That signals to competitors that, if they
should choose to enter, DPAG knows whether it can easily offer a higher
quality. Therefore potential entrants will have to consider to competing with
a seven-day delivery.
The model setting is highly stylized and does not cover all important
aspect of this changing market. Therefore there are some limitations to the
model. We know that the entrants do not cover the same territory as the
incumbent who fulfills the universal service obligation, and certainly will
continue to do so after 2008 as the only firm holding a dominant position.
We have tried to consider this effect by introducing a discount on the realized
price of the entrant. Therefore defining the relevant market as the reserved
area (letters below 50g) may not be appropriate. Instead a market could be
defined as a city-pair.
A further limitation is that consumers face switching costs. Similarly
to call-by-call telephone services where the incumbent DTAG is obliged to
10Post-Universaldienstverordnung (PUDLV).
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provide invoicing services to competitors because customers would not accept
to receive and pay several invoices, customers may not be willing to buy
different sets of stamps or set up lines of credit with several companies. This
would mean that for each correspondence there is a particular set of firms
who offer this origin-destination combination. This creates switching costs
which protects the incumbent to some extent from competition.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the incentives of DPAG or increase there
quality in the light of the upcoming liberalization of the postal services mar-
ket in 2008. We have modeled the market as a vertical differentiation setting
where firms compete on quality and price. The incumbent can commit to a
quality and this allows him to deter entry, if not yet blocked.
As demand in Germany is virtually constant, there would be no incentive
for DPAG to increase its quality at this particular moment, if the market
were not to be liberalized in six months. Therefore, we suggest that the
current changes in market regulation have motivated this quality progression.
In particular, we have shown that this raise in quality is only profitable to
DPAG because it renders entry less profitable or maybe even impossible.
However, consumers benefit from the higher quality, regardless of whether
entry is deterred or accommodated.
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